Mobile Tax Base as a Global Common
CESifo, Munich, 2007
CESifo Working Paper No. 2144
![](https://cesifo.org/DocImg/cesifo1_wp2144.jpg?c=1689237034)
If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the group of loyal and non-loyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further I consider the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of non-price competition. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries’ investment in home attachment.
Public Finance