Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency
CESifo, Munich, 2014
CESifo Working Paper No. 4818
![](https://cesifo.org/DocImg/cesifo1_wp4818.jpg?c=1689236932)
Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the “structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals – the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members – robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.
Public Choice