Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable
CESifo, Munich, 2011
CESifo Working Paper No. 3523
![](https://cesifo.org/DocImg/cesifo1_wp3523.jpg?c=1689236877)
Electoral institutions interact through the incentives they provide to policy makers and voters. In this paper divided government is interpreted as the reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term-limited executives (“lame ducks”) cannot credibly commit to a moderate electoral platform due to missing reelection incentives. By dividing government control voters force a lame duck to compromise on policies with an opposing legislature. Based on data from the US states, I present evidence showing that the probability of divided government is about 8 to 10 percent higher when governors are lame ducks.
Public Choice