Working Paper
Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger
Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra, Frans Van Winden
CESifo, Munich, 2010
CESifo Working Paper No. 3014
CESifo, Munich, 2010
CESifo Working Paper No. 3014
![](https://cesifo.org/DocImg/cesifo1_wp3014.jpg?c=1689236993)
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
CESifo Category
Public Choice
Public Choice
Keywords: spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups
JEL Classification: D710,D720