Working Paper
Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
Axel Dreher, Justina A.V. Fischer
CESifo, Munich, 2009
CESifo Working Paper No. 2699
CESifo, Munich, 2009
CESifo Working Paper No. 2699
![](https://cesifo.org/DocImg/cesifo1_wp2699.jpg?c=1689236889)
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
CESifo Category
Public Choice
Public Choice
Keywords: terrorism, decentralization, federalism, governance quality, government effectiveness
JEL Classification: D740,H400,H700