James Lake

Contesting an International Trade Agreement

Even after Trade Agreements (TAs) are signed, they must be ratified by the respective member governments. However, this ratification process is often uncertain and subject to lobbying by pro-trade and anti-trade interest groups. James Lake and his collaborators Matt Cole and Ben Zissimos have developed a new political economy model of TAs that models the competing lobbying interests and inherent ratification uncertainty. Contrary to prior literature, they show that the TA tariffs balance the liberalising force of lobbying and inherently protectionist government preferences. Moreover, new international political externalities emerge that operate outside of the traditional terms-of-trade externalities.

James Lake’s research agenda focuses broadly on international trade agreements. On the theory side, he examines the forces driving the formation of international trade agreements. How does the process of lobbying and the uncertainty surrounding ratification of trade agreements influence the degree of liberalisation embodied in trade agreements? Why do some countries form Free Trade Agreements (e.g. NAFTA) while others form Custom Unions (e.g. the EU)? On the empirical side, Mr Lake asks: How do temporary trade restrictions impact domestic employment in local labour markets? What explains the many-year delay behind the impact of Free Trade Agreements on bilateral trade flows between members?

James Lake is Assistant Professor of Economics at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. He is a steering committee member of the Midwest International Economics Group and organises the Midwest International Trade Conference held every year in autumn and spring. He holds a B.Econ and an M.Phil in Economics from Monash University, Australia, and a PhD from Johns Hopkins University.