

VOLUME AND VOLATILITY IN THE FX-MARKET:
DOES IT MATTER WHO YOU ARE?

GEIR H. BJØNNES
DAGFINN RIME
HAAKON O. AA. SOLHEIM

CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 786
CATEGORY 6: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
OCTOBER 2002

PRESENTED AT CESIFO VENICE SUMMER INSTITUTE, JULY 2002

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded

- *from the SSRN website:* www.SSRN.com
- *from the CESifo website:* www.CESifo.de

VOLUME AND VOLATILITY IN THE FX-MARKET: DOES IT MATTER WHO YOU ARE?

Abstract

The relationship between volume and volatility has received much attention in the literature of financial markets. However, due to the lack of data, few results have been presented for the foreign exchange market. Further, most studies contain only aggregate series, and can not distinguish between the impact of different instruments or participants. We study the impact of volume on volatility in the the FX-market using a unique data set of daily trading in the Swedish krona (SEK) market. The data set covers 95 per cent of worldwide SEK-trading, and is disaggregated on a number of reporting banks' buying and selling in five different instruments on a daily basis over a period of nine years. We find that volume in general depict a positive correlation with volatility. However, the strength of the relationship depends on the instrument used and the identity of the reporting bank. In particular we find that it is the large Swedish banks that dominate the relationship. These banks are probably also the best informed banks. We interpret this as evidence that heterogeneous expectations are important to understand the volume-volatility relationship.

JEL Classification: F31.

Keywords: volume volatility relation, microstructure, exchange rates.

Geir H. Bjønnes
Stockholm Institute for Financial Research
Wallingatan 11
SE-111 60 Stockholm
Sweden
geir.bjonnes@sifr.org

Dagfinn Rime
Stockholm Institute for Financial Research
P.O.Box 1179 Sentrum
N-0107 Oslo
Norway
dagfinn.rime@norges-bank.no

Haakon O. Aa. Solheim
Norwegian School of Management (BI)
P.O.Box 580
N-1302 Sandvika
Norway
haakon.o.solheim@bi.no

Data is kindly provided to us from the Sveriges Riksbank. We are very grateful to Antti Koivisto for helpful discussions and assistance with collecting the data set. We wish to thank participants at seminars at the 2002 Spring Meeting of Young Economist, the Stockholm Institute of Financial Research, the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the 2002 CESifo Summer Institute and the EFA 2002 Doctoral Tutorial. Views expressed in this paper does not represent those of Norges Bank.

1 Introduction

This paper study the relationship between volume and volatility of exchange rates. The volatility of exchange rates are far bigger than what the volatility of fundamentals like inflation, growth and interest rates implies, and this remains one of the big puzzles of international finance. One possible explanation is that the volatility is revision of expectations. Since changing expectations leads to both trading and price changes, a relationship between volatility and volume arises.

In the FX-market such research has until recently been difficult due to the lack of good trading data. In this paper we use a unique data set provided by Sveriges Riksbank (the Swedish central bank) that enables us to address both the importance of information arrivals and heterogeneous beliefs. The data is based on daily reporting from a number of primary dealers, both Swedish and foreign. Each primary dealer reports their total purchases and sales in five different instruments, *(i)* spot, *(ii)* outright forwards, *(iii)* short swaps (tomorrow-next), *(iv)* FX swaps, and *(v)* options.¹ The data covers as much as 95 per cent of all currency trading in Swedish kroner.

Studies from a number of different market settings suggest that there is a positive relationship between volatility and volume (see Karpoff, 1987). Due to the data problems there is few studies on the FX-market, and those who have actual volume data have only had access to limited parts of total volume. Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) and Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) both use the frequency of indicative quotes on the Reuters FAFX as a proxy of volume. Grammatikos and Saunders (1986) and Jorion (1996) use data on the number of futures contracts traded. Wei (1994) and Hartmann (1999) use Bank of Japan's set on brokered transactions in the Tokyo JPY/USD market. We can restate the volume-volatility findings with a much broader data set. A study using actual volume data is Galati (2000) who has BIS data from for seven developing countries. In general these studies suggest a positive relationship between volatility and volume consistent with evidence from other markets.

An important question is why the volume-volatility relationship arises. Three central contributions on the theory of the relationship between volume and volatility are Clark (1973), Epps and Epps (1976) and Tauchen and Pitts (1983). Clark (1973) introduces the mixture of distribution hypothesis, where the correlation between volume and volatility arises due to arrival of new information which drives both exchange rate changes and volume. Epps and Epps (1976) provide a second, and complementary explanation. They argue that that the volume-volatility relationship is due to the extent which traders disagree when they revise their reservation prices. More heterogenous beliefs should cause more volatility.

Tauchen and Pitts (1983) provide a model that combines these two features. They point out that volume might change over time for different reasons. There might be an increase in the number of traders, arrival of new information or heterogenous beliefs between different traders. The volume-volatility relationship depends on why volume changes, e.g. a trend in volume due to an increase in the number of traders in the market should lead to lower volatility due to higher liquidity.

Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and Shalen (1993) provide models where dispersion of beliefs create both more price variability and excess volume. Shalen (1993) argues that

¹A short swap is a contract to be delivered within two days, e.g. before a spot contract.

uninformed traders increase volatility because they cannot differentiate liquidity demand from fundamental value change. The literature on asymmetric information models (e.g. Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) emphasize the role of heterogenous agents in the pricing process.

This paper makes three contributions. First, we document a positive relationship between volume and volatility using data that covers almost all currency trading in SEK. Although a positive volume-volatility relationship is documented for the FX-market in previous studies, this is to our knowledge the first time such a relationship is documented for one of the ten largest currency markets using such an extensive set of volume data.²

Second, we are able to separate total volume into different instruments. The standard assumption is that the spot market should be the important market for determining the exchange rate. However, previous studies have used data from both the spot market and the forward market. We show that it is indeed the spot volume that is most important. However, we also find some indications that forward and option volume are correlated with spot exchange rate volatility. In case of the forward market we suggest the following intuition: All trades in the forward market are initiated by customers of the banks. This again leads the bank to trade spot in the interbank market to hedge. Hence, the initial information release may first be picked up by forward volume.

Last, but maybe most important, is that we examine the role of heterogeneity in explaining volatility. This is possible since we have the volume of each of the different reporting banks. That means that we have aggregates of volume that is actually observable in the market, however only to the reporting bank. This is truly private information. We address this both by regressing volatility on each bank's volume in separate regressions, and by grouping banks into different categories and regressing volatility on these aggregated group volumes. We find that it is volume of large Swedish banks that tend to create the most volatility. These banks are also most likely the best informed since they have the largest customer base (Lyons, 2001), and indicate a role for heterogenous beliefs for volatility. The importance of heterogenous information for understanding exchange rate changes is also documented recently by Evans and Lyons (2002).

Studies from other market settings also suggest that heterogeneity among the market players may be important to understand volatility (see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) and Daigler and Wiley (1999), both studying futures markets, document the importance of different types of traders for explaining the volume-volatility relationship. Daigler and Wiley (1999) find that trade "speculators", i.e. traders located outside the actual market, tend to be more correlated with volatility than trade by investors in the market. Since these "outsiders" may be interpreted as noise-traders this result is different from ours.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed presentation of our data. In Section 3 we derive testable hypothesis and present the results. Section 4 concludes.

²According to BIS (2002), the Swedish currency market is the eight largest market. The Swedish market is for example larger than the emerging markets studied in Galati (2000).

2 Data

In this section we start with describing our volume data. We then present the macro variables applied in the analysis.

2.1 Volume data

The Riksbank receives *daily* reports from a number of Swedish and foreign banks (currently 13) on their *buying and selling of five different instruments*. The reported series is an aggregate of Swedish krona (SEK) trading against all other currencies, measured in krona, and covers 90–95% of all worldwide trading in the SEK. Close to 100% of all interbank trading and 80–90% of customer trading are made in SEK/EUR. In our analysis we will therefore focus on the SEK/EUR exchange rate.

Aggregate volume information is not available to the market. FX-markets are organized as multiple dealer markets, and have low transparency. The specific reporter will only know her own volume and a noisy signal on aggregate volume that they receive through brokers. Reporting banks do obtain some statistical summaries of volume aggregates from the Riksbank, but only with a considerable lag. The data set used in this paper is not available to market participants.

The data set stretch from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2001. However, the reporting procedure was revised after 1994. In most regressions we will therefore use observations from January 1, 1995. Figure 1 shows the total gross volume in the spot market and the absolute returns in the exchange rate. There is a clear relationship between volume and volatility, especially in periods of high volatility like 1996/97 and in the fall of 1998. We also note that there is no clear trend in the series.

The five instruments are spot, forward, options, short swaps (tomorrow/next) and standard swaps. The short swap is mainly used as a liquidity control instrument when one needs cash with delivery in less than two days (the time of a standard spot transaction). Table 1 gives an indication of the relative usage of the different instruments. We note that as a percentage of total volume in the market, short swaps is the largest category, followed by spot trading. Forward and option trading makes up much smaller parts of total market volume.



Table 1: The importance of different instruments. Sample: 1.1995-12.2001
as % of tot. volume

	Spot	Forward	Short swap	Swap	Option
<i>01.95-12.01</i>					
Mean	0.29	0.06	0.36	0.27	0.03
St.dev.	0.10	0.03	0.10	0.07	0.02
Maximum	0.76	0.40	0.64	0.58	0.25
Minimum	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.00

Numbers are percentages of total volume calculated on a daily basis.

The reporting banks are anonymized. However, we can distinguish between Swedish banks, foreign banks, and branches of foreign banks located in Sweden. The reporters are the main liquidity providers in the SEK-market. They are de facto primary dealers in this market. At most there are 15 reporting banks active in the market.

Figure 1: Gross spot volume and squared returns in the SEK/EUR



volume_spot: gross spot volume,
volat_lsekeur: absolute returns of the log of the SEK/EUR, close to close.

Because of confidentiality reasons we can not display detailed information on the size of each bank. However, only five banks are active over the whole period from 1993 to 2001. These are four Swedish reporters and one branch. Table 2 display their market share. Two of the banks are clearly more important than the other three. These are the two Swedish banks *S1* and *S2*. Together these two banks control between 40 and 50 per cent of the market. Foreign reporters have controlled between 25 and 30 per cent of the market during the last six years.

Table 2: The importance of different primary dealers.

as % of tot. volume <i>01.95-12.01</i>	S1+S2+S3 +S4+B1	S1+S2	Foreign reporters
Mean	0.64	0.43	0.27
St.dev.	0.14	0.10	0.18
Maximum	1.00	0.71	0.74
Minimum	0.22	0.13	0
<hr/> <i>01.93-12.94</i> <hr/>			
Mean	0.84	0.60	0.01
St.dev.	0.04	0.06	0.02
Maximum	0.95	0.80	0.13
Minimum	0.66	0.41	0

Numbers are percentages of total volume calculated on a daily basis.

2.2 Macrodata

In the volatility regressions we use the absolute value of return.³ Return is measured as the change in the log of the exchange rate from close to close.⁴ Note that the SEK has been floating freely since November 1992.


In figure 2 we depict the exchange rate together with the 10 year bond spread between Sweden and Germany. As we see there has been periods of substantial volatility in the FX-market over the period. The period after the floating in November 1992⁵ and the period after the Russian moratorium in August 1998 was especially volatile. There was also strong depreciatory pressure during 2000 and 2001. Over the period the exchange rate has moved within a range of 21 per cent from top to bottom. The standard deviation of daily return over the period has been about 0.4 per cent, with a maximum daily return of 3.2 per cent. The bond spread gives an indication of the macroeconomic developments in Sweden over this period. It has been falling from nearly 5 per cent in 1993 to a current spread fluctuating around zero. This probably reflects both a fall in uncertainty about the Swedish growth prospects as Sweden emerged from recession in the early 1990's, but also the implementation of a credible inflation target by the Swedish Riksbank. Sweden

³Using squared return does not affect the results. Other potential measures for volatility is intra-day high-low or implied volatility from option prices, however such data is not available for the SEK/EUR market.

⁴For the period prior to January 1, 1999 we use SEK/DEM. The exchange rate is indexed to EUR equivalent terms (SEK/DEM*1.95583). Before 1999 DEM played the same role as EUR does at present.

⁵From 1990 till November 1992 the SEK was fixed to the ECU. In November 1992 Sweden experienced a speculative attack, and the SEK was allowed to float.

Figure 2: Swedish and German bond spread and the log of the SEK/EUR exchange rate



introduced an inflation target in 1993. The current target is set by law to be 2 per cent, with a band of ± 1 per cent.

According to the statistics from the BIS 2001 survey of the foreign exchange market, the Swedish market is the eight largest currency market in the world. However, the SEK is still a small currency compared to the EUR, the USD or the JPY. An interesting question is to which extent the volatility in the SEK/EUR market is the reflection of volatility in the relative price of SEK to EUR and to which extent it is the result of volatility in the EUR on a broader scale. One could e.g. think that a movement in the USD/EUR rate would trigger expectations of a similar movement in the SEK/EUR rate. In figure 3 we show the absolute return in the SEK/EUR and the USD/EUR markets. As one can see, there is evidence of some correlation between the two series. The correlation over the period from January 1993 to December 2001 is 0.19.



2.3 Expected vs. unexpected volume

One of the implications of Tauchen and Pitts (1983) is that one needs to make a distinction between “expected” and “unexpected” volume. “Expected” volume should primarily increase liquidity, and should have little impact on volatility. Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) and Hartmann (1999) document the importance of unexpected volume to explain the volume-volatility relationship.

The standard method to distinguish between expected and unexpected volume is to identify systematic time-series features in the volume data. Using standard stationarity tests we find no evidence of non-stationarity. However, when we estimate an ARMA-model on the volume series, the AR-root tends to be outside the unit circle. At the same time we find that the MA coefficient is close to -1.

This feature is identical to what is observed in Hartmann (1999). Hartmann has volume data reported from Tokyo based brokers, covering trading in JPY/USD over the period from 1986 to 1994. He reports that the series are stationary according to standard tests, however the AR-roots are close to a unit root and the MA is close to -1. According to Hartmann the fact that the MA is close to -1 might distort the stationarity

Figure 3: The absolute return in SEK/EUR and USD/EUR



volat_lsekeur: absolute returns of the log of the USD/EUR, close to close,
volat_lusdeur: absolute returns of the log of the SEK/EUR, close to close.

tests. He therefore argues that one should treat the series as non-stationary.

Hartmann (1999) argues that an ARIMA(9,1,1) gives the best fit on his data. This process seems to give a good fit also on our series. Further, Hartmann argues that an ARCH(3) process removes ARCH/GARCH effects from his series. Also this feature can be replicated in our data. The results of the regressions are reported in table 15 in the appendix.

To the ARIMA(9,1,1) model we add a constant and a Monday dummy. Chang, Pinegar and Schachter (1997) document that there tends to be weekday patterns in volume data. Harris and Raviv (1993) have a model that predicts an increase in the volume on Mondays, as dispersion of beliefs are higher after a period of closed markets. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) predict that volume on Mondays will be lower than Tuesdays, due to the fact that private information accrues over weekends, while public information does not. Testing for four weekday dummies, we find that only the Monday-dummy is of special importance. In general we find that the Monday effect on volume is negative, in accordance with the predictions of Foster and Viswanathan (1990).

Our model of expected volume has a reasonable fit. For most series we find a R^2 between 30 and 40 per cent. We use the fitted values as “expected”, and the residual as “unexpected”.

3 Results

Although there seems evident from figure 1 that there is an relation between volume and volatility, when testing for information theoretic explanations we need to control for the volatility that is expected and hence can not be driven by new information or revisions in beliefs. Expected volatility is modelled using a standard GARCH(1,1) regression on the SEK/EUR return. The conditional variance from these regressions is the time-series forecast of risk, and is included in the regressions as “GARCH”. The regression is reported in the appendix in table 16.

All reported regressions are estimated using a GMM. The instrument matrix is specified in each regression table. Because we do a two step regression, and do not estimate the GARCH term as a part of a system, the t -values should be interpreted with care. We do however find that the results for the volume terms are stable with regard to choice of estimation methods.⁶ In all regressions we regress a volatility measure (absolute value of return) on expected and unexpected volume; “GARCH”, which is the one period lagged value of the conditional variance of returns; D1, which is a Monday dummy; and finally we also include the absolute return of the USD/EUR exchange rate.⁷

Table 3 shows a correlation matrix between five different volume aggregates. As we see, the selected volume series are highly correlated. This creates a problem of multicollinearity in the analysis of bank-heterogeneity. Therefore it makes little sense to include a number

⁶We use GMM since there is evidence of non-normality. Using OLS instead does not change any of the results. In addition to the reported regressions we have estimated volatility using GARCH(1,1) models, results are similar. One should note that there is some evidence of Chow-forecast instability in the regressions. This can be corrected by including a number of dummies. Such inclusions do not seem to have much effect on the volume parameters. Recursive regressions reveal that parameter stability in the volume parameters reported is good.

⁷Using squared returns instead of absolute returns give similar results.

Table 3: Correlation matrix—unexpected spot volume

	Total spot	S1	S2	S3	S4
Total spot	1				
S1	0.68	1			
S2	0.76	0.56	1		
S3	0.50	0.33	0.41	1	
S4	0.64	0.49	0.59	0.41	1
B1	0.38	0.24	0.27	0.25	0.28

“Total spot” is total unexpected spot volume aggregated over the reporting banks, “S1”, “S2” “S3”, “S4” and “B1” is total unexpected spot volume of Swedish Bank 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Branch 1 respectively.

of different volume aggregates in the same regression. Instead we run several regression of volatility on a number of different volume aggregates for each bank. However, we also report some results where we aggregate groups of banks together.

The rest of this section provides results from estimations of volatility on volume in different “instruments” and volume from different “reporters” or groups of reporters.

3.1 Instruments

The most common approach to estimating the volume-volatility relationship would be to regress the volatility of spot exchange rates on some measure of spot volume, e.g. Jorion uses future market volume as a proxy while Galati use spot volume. A reasonable a priori assumption is that a volume-volatility relationship for the spot exchange rate should be dominated by transactions in the spot market. Lyons (2001) describes the spot market as the driving force of the FX-market. A swap transaction as an comparison has no “order flow” effect, as it is just two opposing transactions being made at the same time.

However, volume in other instruments than spot might still reflect arrival of new information or dispersion of beliefs, and thereby also be informative about spot *volatility*. As an example think of speculation by customers. This is most commonly done by forward trading, which again will trigger spot-trading in the interbank market. In this case the information effect might primarily be picked up by the forward volume. This analogous to the informational advantage of banks with huge customer order flow that is reported in recent surveys by Cheung and Chinn (2001). Similarly, option volume may reflect changes in beliefs about the true spot volatility, potentially due to new information. So it could be interesting to see whether other instruments also can explain volatility. But, and this is a big but, since forwards, options and swaps also are hedging instruments we could have the reverse causality.

Table 4 and 5 reports the estimations of volatility on the volume of all instruments and on volume for each of the five instruments respectively. We estimate both with the instruments together and in separate regressions due to problems with multicollinearity.

First, despite the inclusion of expected variance in the model, there is a positive correlation between volume and volatility. We focus on unexpected volume. Table 4 show that there are significant and positive coefficients for spot and option volume. The coefficient of short swaps is significant, but negative.

Table 5 reports the separate regressions for each of the instruments. We find a correctly signed and significant relationship in three of the five instruments: spot, forwards

Table 4: Estimating $returns$ —all instruments

	Period								
	01.95-12.01	01.95-06.98	07.98-12.01						
C	0.0008	2.81	**	0.0022	4.47	**	0.0000	0.01	**
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.1178	3.74	**	0.1776	4.98	**	0.0924	4.04	**
D1	3.92E-04	2.24	*	4.32E-04	1.85	*	3.06E-04	1.23	**
GARCH(t-1)	49.509	5.41	**	27.665	2.15	*	47.274	4.45	**
exp. Spot	4.53E-08	4.23	**	5.82E-08	3.83	**	4.69E-08	2.67	**
exp. Forward	-1.75E-07	-3.53	**	-3.00E-07	-4.39	**	-6.43E-08	-0.73	**
exp. Short swap	-9.38E-09	-1.09	*	-3.49E-08	-2.57	*	2.14E-09	0.22	**
exp. Swap	1.75E-08	1.39	*	2.87E-08	1.32	*	5.00E-09	0.34	**
exp. Option	1.07E-07	2.32	*	-1.29E-07	-0.94	*	6.19E-08	1.23	**
unexp. Spot	9.12E-08	9.72	**	1.06E-07	8.21	**	7.56E-08	5.90	**
unexp. Forward	-1.11E-08	-0.54	*	5.21E-08	1.43	*	-1.35E-08	-0.56	**
unexp. Short swap	-2.94E-08	-5.36	**	-4.58E-08	-5.77	**	-2.01E-08	-2.92	**
unexp. Swap	2.35E-09	0.42	*	1.94E-08	1.54	*	-7.42E-10	-0.12	**
unexp. Option	9.92E-08	3.40	**	-1.24E-07	-6.03	**	1.10E-07	3.47	**
R^2 -adj.	0.21			0.24			0.19		
SEE	2.58E-03			2.53E-03			2.63E-03		
DW	2.04			2.04			1.98		
TOR (11 d.f.)	13.68	0.23		13.41	0.27		12.07	0.36	

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

$C, D1, GARCH(-1)(exp.volume), (exp.volume)^2, GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume), (unexp.volume)^2, GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc))), (abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2, GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 5: Estimating $|returns|$ —01.1995 to 12.2001

Instrument	Spot	Forward		Short swap		Swap		Option						
C	0.0004	1.25	0.0012	4.75	**	0.0013	4.67	**	0.0011	4.39	**	0.0010	3.99	**
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.1334	3.96	**	0.1887	**	0.2118	5.96	**	0.2101	5.78	**	0.2003	5.43	**
D1	2.94E-04	1.68	**	2.06E-04	**	8.10E-05	0.47	**	1.42E-04	0.82	**	1.28E-04	0.75	**
GARCH(t-1)	61.408	5.77	**	55.325	**	56.909	5.44	**	56.522	5.49	**	60.548	5.96	**
exp. volume	2.93E-08	2.98	**	1.75E-09	**	-3.38E-09	-0.85	**	4.30E-10	0.09	**	3.11E-08	0.96	**
unexp.volume	7.32E-08	10.11	**	1.28E-07	**	6.53E-09	1.45	**	2.35E-08	4.58	**	1.52E-07	4.53	**
R^2 -adj.	0.19		0.12			0.11			0.11			0.13		
SEE	2.61E-03		2.73E-03			2.75E-03			2.74E-03			2.72E-03		
DW	2.01		1.94			1.93			1.93			1.94		
TOR (3 d.f.)	6.12	0.11	5.11	0.14		9.81	0.02	*	2.66	0.45		0.93	0.82	

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C, D1, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

and options. First, note that the fit of the regression is best for the regression using spot volume and that the coefficients on spot volume is similar as in table 4. Second, the significant effect from short swaps have disappeared. This is somewhat reassuring. Short swaps are primarily liquidity instruments, while ordinary swaps are more interest rate related instruments. It is much harder to think about information releases that might trigger swap volume instead of spot volume, while still having implication for spot exchange rate, than it is with forwards and options. Finally, both forwards and options are significant and correctly signed. Given the ambiguous effect from these instruments in the combined regression we use only spot volumes in later regressions.

The R^2 values are in the range between 10 and 25 per cent. This is in line with other studies that regress volatility on volume. According to Daigler and Wiley (1999) R^2 values in such regressions typically range from 10 to 35 per cent.

Table 6: Size effects—01.1995 to 12.01

	St.dev.	Parameter	Implied volatility	% of FX-vola.
<i>abs. returns</i>	2.91E-03			
<i>exp. Spot</i>	8769	4.53E-08	3.97E-04	13.66
<i>exp. Forward</i>	3020	-1.75E-07	-5.28E-04	-18.16
<i>exp. Short swap</i>	20030	-9.38E-09	-1.88E-04	-6.46
<i>exp. Swap</i>	16741	1.75E-08	2.93E-04	10.07
<i>exp. Option</i>	2731	1.07E-07	2.92E-04	10.05
<i>unexp. Spot</i>	10377	9.12E-08	9.46E-04	32.53
<i>unexp. Forward</i>	3706	-1.11E-08	-4.11E-05	-1.41
<i>unexp. Short swap</i>	15379	-2.94E-08	-4.52E-04	-15.54
<i>unexp. Swap</i>	12459	2.35E-09	2.93E-05	1.01
<i>unexp. Option</i>	2964	9.92E-08	2.94E-04	10.11
<i>GARCH</i>	1.04E-05	49.509	5.15E-04	17.70
<i>abs. returns USD</i>	4.05E-03	0.1178	4.77E-04	16.41

“Per cent of FX-volatility” is the ratio of implied volatility over the standard deviation of absolute returns in the SEK/EUR. All parameters are collected from table 4.

The size effects of the parameter values in table 4 are not obvious. To give an indication of size effects we perform an illustrative exercise. One standard deviation of absolute returns is $2.19 \cdot 10^{-3}$. If we take one standard deviation of the GARCH term ($1.04 \cdot 10^{-5}$) and multiply this with the parameter of value of 49.509 (in the case of the spot-volume regression), we obtain $5.15 \cdot 10^{-4}$. This indicates that in this regression the GARCH term can explain about 18 per cent of the volatility in returns. A similar procedure for unexpected spot volume gives a factor of 33 per cent. We also see that unexpected volume is a more important explanatory factor than is expected volume. This indicates that unexpected volume is indeed an important explanatory factor, at least compared with the GARCH term. A list of calculations is performed in table 6. We see that spot volume explains almost three times as much of volatility than what does option volume. The explanatory power of swap volume is only a fraction of the above numbers.

Table 7: Estimating $|returns|$ (a)

	Period											
	01.93-12.94	01.95-06.98	07.98-12.01	01.95-12.01								
C	0.0011	1.05	0.0002	0.69	0.0003	1.11	0.0001	0.22				
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.0381	0.84	0.1637	5.05	**	0.1838	4.60	**	0.1111	4.66	**	
D1	-2.06E-04	-0.52	3.92E-04	2.31	*	5.23E-04	2.24	*	2.43E-04	1.00		
GARCH(t-1)	48.738	3.57	**	46.383	3.86	**	16.081	1.00	54.893	4.19	**	
exp. spot S1	6.22E-08	1.39	**	2.26E-07	4.10	**	2.91E-07	3.58	**	2.60E-07	3.44	**
unexp. spotS1	1.38E-07	4.51	**	3.47E-07	11.34	**	3.94E-07	11.43	**	2.89E-07	5.90	**
R^2 -adj.	0.08		0.20			0.26			0.15			
SEE	3.81E-03		2.61E-03			2.50E-03			2.68E-03			
DW	2.00		2.02			2.05			1.97			
TOR (3 d.f.)	4.04	0.26		0.45	0.93		0.51	0.92		2.30	0.81	

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

$C, D1, GARCH(-1)(exp.volume), (exp.volume)^2, GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume), (unexp.volume)^2, GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc)), (abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2, GARCH(-1))^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *5 per cent, **1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 8: Estimating $|returns|$ (b)

	Period							
	01.93-12.94	01.95-06.98	07.98-12.01	01.95-12.01				
C	-0.0005	-0.54	0.0002	0.58	2.21	*	-0.0003	-0.57
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.0199	0.46	0.1565	4.72	**	0.1938	4.63	**
D1	-1.51E-04	-0.37	3.56E-04	2.00	*	2.97E-04	1.26	**
GARCH(t-1)	28.268	2.18	54.357	4.65	**	56.993	4.35	**
exp. spot S2	1.31E-07	3.55	1.52E-07	2.68	**	6.27E-08	1.17	**
unexp. spot S2	8.21E-08	3.28	3.07E-07	9.53	**	3.37E-07	7.75	**
R^2 -adj.	0.11		0.18		0.21		0.17	
SEE	3.74E-03		2.63E-03		2.58E-03		2.65E-03	
DW	2.03		1.99		1.98		1.99	
TOR (3 d.f.)	6.78	0.08	2.38	0.50	5.74	0.12	1.94	0.86

	Period							
	01.93-12.94	01.95-06.98	07.98-12.01	01.95-12.01				
C	-0.0007	-0.60	0.0008	3.38	**	0.0011	4.18	**
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.0588	1.35	0.1927	5.29	**	0.2426	5.46	**
D1	1.66E-05	0.04	2.24E-04	1.31		-6.49E-05	-0.28	
GARCH(t-1)	40.762	3.16	65.905	6.89	**	47.414	4.54	**
exp. spot S3	3.50E-07	2.94	9.00E-08	1.57	**	3.96E-08	0.71	**
unexp. spot S3	8.47E-08	1.53	4.18E-07	7.11	**	3.99E-07	4.91	**
R^2 -adj.	0.07		0.13		0.15		0.12	
SEE	3.83E-03		2.71E-03		2.68E-03		2.74E-03	
DW	2.01		1.96		1.96		1.92	
TOR (3 d.f.)	4.35	0.23	8.86	0.03	*	14.84	0.00	**

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C, D1, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc)))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: * -5 per cent, ** -1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 9: Estimating $|returns|$ (c)

	Period		01.95-06.98		07.98-12.01		01.95-12.01					
	01.93-12.94	1.61	0.0008	3.26	**	0.0009	3.90	**	0.0007	2.43	*	
C	0.0012	1.61	0.0008	3.26	**	0.0009	3.90	**	0.0007	2.43	*	
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.0380	0.81	0.1714	5.06	**	0.2013	5.18	**	0.1154	5.00	**	
D1	-1.62E-04	-0.38	3.08E-04	1.89		3.09E-04	1.39		1.60E-04	0.69		
GARCH(t-1)	57.017	4.53	**	58.749	5.44	**	46.416	3.23	**	62.499	4.76	**
exp. spot S4	8.65E-08	1.55	**	1.46E-07	3.02	**	1.42E-07	2.42	*	2.16E-07	2.66	**
unexp. spot S4	1.77E-07	3.15	**	4.92E-07	9.09	**	6.07E-07	8.48	**	3.75E-07	5.81	**
R²-adj.	0.04		0.18			0.23			0.14			
SEE	3.87E-03		2.64E-03			2.55E-03			2.71E-03			
DW	2.01		1.99			2.00			1.94			
TOR (3 d.f.)	5.02	0.17	0.52	0.91		4.90	0.18		2.05	0.56		

	Period		01.95-06.98		07.98-12.01		01.95-12.01					
	01.93-12.94	6.14	**	0.0012	5.36	**	0.0013	4.71	**	0.0012	3.84	**
C	0.0028	6.14	**	0.0012	5.36	**	0.0013	4.71	**	0.0012	3.84	**
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.0780	1.83		0.1945	5.45	**	0.2729	6.08	**	0.1092	4.56	**
D1	-5.69E-04	-1.36		9.91E-05	0.57		-2.71E-05	-0.11		4.26E-05	0.18	
GARCH(t-1)	24.505	1.61		54.237	5.72	**	43.953	4.26	**	56.750	4.34	**
exp. spot B1	7.52E-07	1.06		1.56E-08	0.21		-3.34E-07	-1.38		2.34E-07	2.33	*
unexp. spot B1	2.55E-07	0.55		3.58E-07	4.08	**	2.39E-07	0.95	**	3.55E-07	3.97	**
R²-adj.	0.03		0.11			0.12			0.12			
SEE	3.89E-03		2.74E-03			2.73E-03			2.74E-03			
DW	1.96		1.94			1.96			1.89			
TOR (3 d.f.)	5.74	0.12	8.12	0.04	*	15.91	0.00	**	5.22	0.16		

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C, D1, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc)))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 10: Estimating $|returns|$

Reporter	Period	exp. spot		unexp. spot		R2-adj.	SEE
S5	01.95-01.98	4.36E-06		4.13E-06		0.13	2.80E-03
		2.08	*	2.62	**		
S9	01.95-11.97	1.74E-06		2.38E-06		0.21	2.71E-03
		4.18	**	5.52	**		
S10	01.95-12.97	1.54E-06		4.03E-06		0.13	2.82E-03
		1.91		5.61	**		
B2	01.95-12.01	4.17E-07		6.24E-07		0.14	2.69E-03
		3.88	**	6.55	**		
B3	01.95-06.98	6.13E-07		7.52E-07		0.18	2.62E-03
		4.03	**	5.64	**		
B8	01.95-3.97	1.14E-06		1.19E-06		0.14	2.97E-03
		2.1	*	4.58	**		
F1	01.95-12.01	-3.16E-08		9.97E-08		0.11	2.74E-03
		-1.81		2.93	**		
F2	01.97-12.01	3.84E-08		2.65E-07		0.11	2.62E-03
		0.55		3.77	**		
F3	01.97-06.98	-6.86E-09		3.68E-07		0.04	2.37E-03
		-0.05		1.89			
F4	01.95-10.00	1.71E-08		-7.55E-11		0.13	2.72E-03
		0.48		0			
F5	06.00-07.01	1.34E-06		8.24E-07		0.05	2.32E-03
		5.26	**	5.35	**		
F6	02.99-12.01	1.26E-07		2.10E-07		0.06	2.44E-03
		1.1		2.96	**		
F7	08.99-12.01	5.04E-07		5.01E-07		0.09	2.50E-03
		4.05	**	6.28	**		

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C , $D1$, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: Regressions include (not reported): D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays, GARCH - conditional variance of returns and $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 11: Size effects, spot volume—01.1995 to 12.01

	St.dev.	Parameter	Implied volatility	% of FX-vola.
<i>abs. returns</i>	2.91E-03			
<i>Unexp. Spot</i>	10377	7.32E-08	7.60E-04	26.11
<i>Unexp. S1</i>	2639	3.47E-07	9.16E-04	31.48
<i>Unexp. S2</i>	2970	3.07E-07	9.12E-04	31.35
<i>Unexp. S3</i>	1337	4.18E-07	5.59E-04	19.21
<i>Unexp. S4</i>	1510	4.92E-07	7.43E-04	25.53
<i>Unexp. B1</i>	802	3.58E-07	2.87E-04	9.87

“Per cent of FX-volatility” is the ratio of implied volatility over the standard deviation of absolute returns in the SEK/EUR. Parameters collected from tables 7-10.

3.2 Reporters

Recent research from the microstructure approach to foreign exchange indicate that traders have different strategies and information (see e.g. Lyons, 1995; Bjonnes and Rime, 2000). It is also reasonable to assume that different banks will focus on specific types of trading strategies (Cheung and Chinn, 2001). However, banks are mostly unwilling to reveal their explicit strategies, so this is a topic where few results have been published.

We have bank-specific volumes and can therefore test for differential impact from banks on volatility directly. A priori it is not obvious that different reporters should be correlated differently with volatility. If the increase in number of transactions is due to arrival of public information, we should expect a simultaneous increase in trading from all reporters. However, if dispersion of beliefs is an important feature for generating the volume-volatility relationship then the trading of some reporters might be more closely correlated with volatility than the volume of other reporters. Hence, we can differentiate between the two potential sources of the volume-volatility relationship.

Tables 7-9 reports findings for the five banks that are represented in the total sample, as well as regressions on total spot volume as a base comparison.⁸ To assure a test of parameter stability we report tests on four different time intervals. We estimate over the period 1993-1994 and over the period 1995-2001. For the last interval we also conduct estimations on two sub-samples of equal length. As one can see there is high consistency across the time intervals (see table 17 in the appendix). However, R^2 is substantially lower for the 1993-94 period. This can maybe be explained by the way spot-volume was reported in this period.

Table 10 reports estimations on 13 additional banks. These are banks that are only in our sample for shorter periods of time. Mostly these are banks of much lesser size than the five banks reported in tables 7-9. For the 13 banks in table 10 we estimate over the whole period where data are available for the respective banks. Only volume coefficients are reported.

As can be seen from the four tables we find that the positive correlation between volume and volatility found for aggregate spot is held up when we instead aggregate for different banks. However, size is of importance. The largest banks, S1 and S2, clearly have the strongest relationship with spot volume. This is confirmed in table 11, where we see that unexpected volume from S1 and S2 in fact explain more of volatility than unexpected volume from aggregate spot volume.

The results presented in 7-10 clearly indicate that different reporters *have different impact*. This impact is also related to the size of the bank. However, it also seems to be related to the length of the bank's presence in the market. The results in table 10 indicate that banks that are only operating as primary dealers for short periods of time tends to have less correlation between volume and volatility.

The issue of the size of the bank can be tested more thoroughly. In table 12 we have estimated the relationship by grouping reporting banks into three categories, small, medium, and large, according to size of volume. Aggregated the two banks included in "large banks" on average control 41 per cent of daily spot trading. In "medium sized banks" we include four banks that on average control 32 per cent of trading in the spot

⁸We only use spot volumes here since last section showed that most of the effect comes from spot volume.

Table 12: Estimating $|returns|$ —banks by size, estimated over the period 01.95-12.01

Bank size	Large			Medium			Small		
C	0.0004	<i>1.22</i>		0.0008	<i>2.62</i>	**	0.0012	<i>4.28</i>	**
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.1479	<i>4.58</i>	**	0.1725	<i>4.89</i>	**	0.1832	<i>5.30</i>	**
D1	3.91E-04	<i>2.26</i>	*	2.20E-04	<i>1.29</i>		1.42E-04	<i>0.80</i>	
GARCH(t-1)	59.533	<i>4.98</i>	**	66.647	<i>6.07</i>	**	62.424	<i>6.02</i>	**
exp. volume	6.59E-08	<i>2.17</i>	*	3.58E-08	<i>1.87</i>		-6.19E-09	<i>-0.31</i>	
unexp.volume	1.94E-07	<i>11.16</i>	**	1.75E-07	<i>6.99</i>	**	1.00E-07	<i>6.19</i>	**
R^2-adj.	0.21			0.16			0.12		
SEE	2.58E-03			2.67E-03			2.72E-03		
DW	2.02			1.97			1.98		
TOR (3 d.f.)	0.00	<i>1.00</i>		0.61	<i>0.89</i>		16.13	<i>0.00</i>	**

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C , $D1$, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc)))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: abs(d(lusdeurc)) - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 13: Estimating $|returns|$ —banks by size

	Period								
	01.95-12.01			01.95-06.98			07.98-12.01		
C	0.0005	<i>1.65</i>		0.0007	<i>2.00</i>	*	-0.0002	<i>-0.31</i>	
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.1507	<i>4.73</i>	**	0.1846	<i>4.90</i>	**	0.1016	<i>4.44</i>	**
D1	4.03E-04	<i>2.36</i>	*	4.96E-04	<i>2.16</i>	*	3.88E-04	<i>1.59</i>	
GARCH(t-1)	54.328	<i>4.60</i>	**	66.312	<i>4.78</i>	**	47.172	<i>3.65</i>	**
exp. Large	8.07E-08	<i>2.41</i>	*	3.64E-08	<i>1.01</i>		2.02E-07	<i>4.72</i>	**
exp. Medium	-9.59E-09	<i>-0.56</i>		-2.19E-08	<i>-0.79</i>		-3.71E-08	<i>-1.51</i>	
exp. Small	-1.49E-08	<i>-0.75</i>		5.86E-09	<i>0.17</i>		-4.13E-08	<i>-1.41</i>	
unexp. Large	1.81E-07	<i>8.50</i>	**	1.80E-07	<i>5.85</i>	**	1.74E-07	<i>5.49</i>	**
unexp. Medium	2.81E-08	<i>1.07</i>		8.54E-08	<i>1.92</i>		-3.76E-09	<i>-0.13</i>	
unexp. Small	7.79E-09	<i>0.50</i>		-1.78E-08	<i>-0.93</i>		3.05E-08	<i>1.25</i>	
R^2-adj.	0.21			0.26			0.19		
SEE	2.58E-03			2.50E-03			2.63E-03		
DW	2.02			1.99			2.02		
TOR (9 d.f.)	4.01	<i>0.78</i>		9.74	<i>0.20</i>		4.61	<i>0.71</i>	

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C , $D1$, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc)))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: abs(d(lusdeurc)) - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

Table 14: Estimating $|returns|$ —reporters by nationality

	Period								
	01.95-12.01			01.95-06.98			07.98-12.01		
C	0.0008	<i>2.74</i>	**	0.0010	<i>2.92</i>	**	0.0000	<i>-0.08</i>	
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.1419	<i>4.40</i>	**	0.1643	<i>4.21</i>	**	0.0976	<i>4.12</i>	**
D1	3.46E-04	<i>2.04</i>	*	3.81E-04	<i>1.68</i>		4.07E-04	<i>1.59</i>	
GARCH(t-1)	65.954	<i>5.62</i>	**	75.399	<i>5.61</i>	**	50.380	<i>3.88</i>	**
exp. Swedish	2.37E-08	<i>1.37</i>		1.27E-09	<i>0.07</i>		1.01E-07	<i>4.39</i>	**
exp. Foreign	-9.10E-09	<i>-0.88</i>		6.95E-09	<i>0.37</i>		-1.80E-08	<i>-0.98</i>	
unexp. Swedish	1.36E-07	<i>11.02</i>	**	1.46E-07	<i>9.22</i>	**	1.23E-07	<i>6.09</i>	**
unexp. Foreign	9.36E-09	<i>0.75</i>		1.32E-09	<i>0.08</i>		1.59E-08	<i>0.90</i>	
R^2-adj.	0.22			0.26			0.18		
SEE	2.58E-03			2.50E-03			2.63E-03		
DW	2.01			1.97			2.01		
TOR (9 d.f.)	2.31	<i>0.81</i>		0.77	<i>0.98</i>		3.46	<i>0.63</i>	

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

C , $D1$, $GARCH(-1)(exp.volume)$, $(exp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume)$, $(unexp.volume)^2$, $GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc))$, $(abs(d(lusdeurc))^2$, $GARCH(-1)^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *-5 per cent, **-1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: abs(d(lusdeurc)) - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

market.

We see that all groups have a significant effect on volume. The explanatory power of the regressions is however best for the large banks. Since multicollinearity is less of a problem between these three groups we can also test the relationship with all groups together. This is reported in 13 where we again see that it is the largest banks that dominate the volume-volatility relationship indicating a role for heterogenous beliefs.

This is further confirmed in table 14 where we group the banks according to whether they are located in Sweden or not. We see that it is the Swedish banks' volume that is significant. These are also the largest banks in the SEK/EUR market, again confirming the size-effect above.

4 Conclusion

The literature on volume and volatility asks one primary question: why does the relationship arise? If everyone have the same expectations, and every group behave similarly, the effect should be caused by more trading due to the arrival of new information. However, all rational agents should have the same opportunity to take advantage of the new information, and heterogeneity should be of less importance. On the other hand, if the volume-volatility relationship is the result of dispersion of beliefs, then heterogeneity is certainly a central feature in the analysis.

This paper reviews evidence from a unique set of volume data from the Swedish FX-market, covering five and half years of daily data. The Swedish market is a small market compared with e.g. the USD/EUR or USD/JPY market. However SEK/EUR is among

the 10 most traded currency crosses in the world, and the market is well developed with high liquidity. For this market we find evidence to indicate that different agents have different effects on the volume-volatility relationship. In particular we find that it is the volume of the largest banks that is most important. In the SEK-market these banks are Swedish-banks. It is reason to believe that the large Swedish banks are relatively well informed. This in contrast with the result of Daigler and Wiley from future markets that it is the volume of the least informed traders that creates the volume-volatility relationship. While the Daigler and Wiley result is about noise-traders, our result is one about information advantage.

We also document that these differences are of some magnitude. This might indicate evidence of the importance of dispersion of beliefs to understand why volume and volatility display positive correlation.

Table 15: Estimating an ARIMA(9,1,1) process on volume. Period: 01.95-12.01

Period	Spot volume			S1	S2	S3						
	01.1995-12.2001	All	All									
C	1450.30	6.93	**	156.95	3.59	**	296.90	3.95	**	44.36	2.11	*
Monday dummy	-7228.39	-6.93	**	-794.03	-3.61	**	-1493.77	-3.98	**	-214.20	-2.04	*
AR(1)	0.254	8.66	**	0.239	8.12	**	0.321	9.97	**	0.098	0.29	
AR(2)	0.079	2.90	**	0.093	3.27	**	0.062	1.76		0.054	0.50	
AR(3)	0.014	0.56		-0.005	-0.20		0.023	0.71		-0.024	-0.78	
AR(4)	0.036	1.61		0.110	5.01	**	0.075	2.42	*	0.006	0.17	
AR(5)	0.156	7.58	**	0.060	2.77	**	0.080	2.76	**	0.018	0.73	
AR(6)	0.029	1.28		0.015	0.71		0.036	1.14		-0.064	-2.37	*
AR(7)	-0.032	-1.56		-0.015	-0.76		0.015	0.53		0.015	0.49	
AR(8)	-0.017	-0.91		-0.003	-0.12		0.022	0.78		-0.038	-1.68	
AR(9)	0.021	1.02		0.036	1.74		0.021	0.76		-0.008	-0.28	
MA(1)	-0.963	-96.75	**	-0.972	-138.18	**	-0.988	-256.82	**	-0.922	-2.64	**
R²-adj.	0.36			0.35			0.33			0.39		
Q-stat.	19.05	0.04	*	10.17	0.43		18.33	0.05		33.47	0.00	**
Theil's IC	0.17			0.23			0.19			0.25		
GARCH(3,0)												
C	9.34E+07	21.41	**	4.88E+06	23.23	**	1.15E+07	25.32	**	8.60E+05	11.79	**
ARCH(1)	0.237	7.88	**	0.233	7.11	**	0.095	4.99	**	0.277	4.98	**
ARCH(2)	0.063	2.55	*	0.077	3.55	**	0.082	3.29	**	0.124	2.70	**
ARCH(3)	0.053	2.80	**	0.056	2.80	**	0.007	0.50		0.214	2.55	*

Estimated using an GARCH(3,0).

Q-stat is estimated using 20 lags.

Theil's inequality coefficient is a measure of model fit. If takes a value between zero and one, with zero as perfect fit.

Table 16: Estimation of conditional variance in the SEK/EUR

GARCH(1,1) for log-returns 01.93-12.01			
C	2.76E-05	<i>0.33</i>	
Variance			
C	3.26E-07	<i>4.43</i>	**
ARCH	0.055	<i>9.12</i>	**
GARCH	0.929	<i>123.15</i>	**
R²-adj.	0.00		
F-test (ARCH)	1.09	<i>0.30</i>	

Estimated using GARCH(1,1).

Table 17: Estimating $|returns|$ (a)

	Period								
	01.93-12.94	01.95-06.98	07.98-12.01	01.95-12.01					
C	-0.0016	-1.40	0.0004	1.25	0.0006	1.71	-0.0006	-1.05	
abs(d(lusdeurc))	0.0214	0.48	0.1334	3.96	**	0.1774	4.35	**	
D1	-3.73E-07	0.00	2.94E-04	1.68	**	3.78E-04	1.54	**	
GARCH(t-1)	41.911	3.45	61.408	5.77	**	61.916	4.69	**	
exp. spot volume	5.05E-08	3.75	2.93E-08	2.98	**	2.11E-08	1.51	**	
unexp. spot volume	4.15E-08	4.89	7.32E-08	10.11	**	8.81E-08	8.67	**	
R²-adj.	0.11		0.19			0.22		0.17	
SEE	3.73E-03		2.61E-03			2.56E-03		2.65E-03	
DW	2.05		2.01			2.05		1.97	
TOR (3 d.f.)	4.23	0.24	6.12	0.11		0.47	0.93	1.73	0.63

Note1: Estimated with GMM. Instrument matrix:

$C, D1, GARCH(-1)(exp.volume), (exp.volume)^2, GARCH(-1)(unexp.volume), (unexp.volume)^2, GARCH(-1)(abs(d(lusdeurc)), (abs(d(lusdeurc)))^2, GARCH(-1))^2$

Note2: TOR: Test of over-identifying restrictions, calculated using J-statistic.

Note3: Coefficient sizes: All exchange rates are in logs. Volume is measured in million SEK.

Note 4: *5 per cent, **1 per cent.

Note 5: D1 - takes value 1 on Mondays.

Note 6: GARCH - conditional variance of returns.

Note 7: $abs(d(lusdeurc))$ - absolute value of returns in the USD/EUR.

References

- Admati, Anat R. and Paul Pfleiderer (1988). A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability. *Review of Financial Studies*, 1(1), pp. 3–40.
- Bessembinder, Hendrik and Paul J. Seguin (1992). Futures-Trading Activity and Stock Price Volatility. *Journal of Finance*, 47(5), pp. 2015–34.
- Bessembinder, Hendrik and Paul J. Seguin (1993). Price Volatility, Trading Volume, and Market Depth: Evidence from Futures Markets. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 28, pp. 21–40.
- BIS (2002). *Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivative Market Activity. 2001*. Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, Basle.
- Bjønnes, Geir H. and Dagfinn Rime (2000). FX Trading ... LIVE! Dealer Behavior and Trading Systems in Foreign Exchange Markets. Memorandum 29/2000, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Norway.
- Bollerslev, Tim and Ian Domowitz (1993). Trading Patterns and Prices in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market. *Journal of Finance*, 48(4), pp. 1421–43.
- Chang, Eric C., J. Michael Pinegar and Barry Schachter (1997). Interday Variations in Volume, Variance and Participation of Large Speculators. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 21, pp. 797–810.
- Cheung, Yin-Wong and Menzie D. Chinn (2001). Currency Traders and Exchange Rate Dynamics: A Survey of the U.S. Market. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 20(4), pp. 439–71.
- Clark, Peter K. (1973). A Subordinated Stochastic Process Model with Finite Variance for Speculative Prices. *Econometrica*, 41, pp. 135–55.
- Daigler, Robert T. and Marilyn K. Wiley (1999). The Impact of Trader Type on the Futures Volatility-Volume Relation. *Journal of Finance*, 54(6), pp. 2297–2316.
- Epps, Thomas W. and Mary Lee Epps (1976). The Stochastic Dependence of Security Price Changes and Transaction Volumes: Implications for the Mixture-of-Distributions Hypothesis. *Econometrica*, 44, pp. 305–321.
- Evans, Martin D. D. and Richard K. Lyons (2002). Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics. *Journal of Political Economy*, 110(1), pp. 170–80.
- Foster, F. Douglas and S. Viswanathan (1990). A Theory of the Interday Variations in Volume, Variance, and Trading Costs in Securities Markets. *Review of Financial Studies*, 3(4), pp. 593–624.
- Galati, Gabriele (2000). Trading Volumes, Volatility and Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets: Evidence from Emerging Market Countries. Working Paper 93, Bank for International Settlements.

- Goodhart, Charles A. E. and L. Figliuoli (1991). Every Minutes Counts in Financial Markets. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 10(1), pp. 23–52.
- Grammatikos, Theoharry and Anthony Saunders (1986). Futures Price Variability: A Test of Maturity and Volume Effects. *Journal of Business*, 59, pp. 319–330.
- Grinblatt, Mark and Matti Keloharju (2001). How Distance, Language, and Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades. *Journal of Finance*, 56(3), pp. 1053–73.
- Harris, Milton A. and Arthur Raviv (1993). Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race. *Review of Financial Studies*, 6(3), pp. 473–506.
- Hartmann, Philipp (1999). Trading Volumes and Transaction Costs in the Foreign Exchange Market. Evidence from Daily Dollar–Yen Spot Data. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 23, pp. 801–24.
- Jorion, Phillipe (1996). Risk and Turnover in the Foreign Exchange Market. In Jeffrey A. Frankel, Giampaolo Galli and Alberto Giovannini (eds.), *The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 19–37.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M. (1987). The Relation Between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A Survey. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 22(1), pp. 109–26.
- Kyle, Albert S. (1985). Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. *Econometrica*, 53(6), pp. 1315–35.
- Lyons, Richard K. (1995). Tests of Microstructural Hypothesis in the Foreign Exchange Market. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 39, pp. 321–51.
- Lyons, Richard K. (2001). *The Microstructure Approach to Exchange Rates*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Shalen, Catherine T. (1993). Volume, Volatility, and the Dispersion of Beliefs. *Review of Financial Studies*, 6(2), pp. 405–34.
- Tauchen, Georg E. and Mark Pitts (1983). The Price Variability-Volume Relationship on Speculative Markets. *Econometrica*, 51, pp. 485–505.
- Wei, Shang-Jin (1994). Anticipations of Foreign Exchange Volatility and Bid-Ask Spreads. Working Paper 4737, NBER.

CESifo Working Paper Series

(for full list see www.cesifo.de)

- 719 Tapio Palokangas, The Political Economy of Collective Bargaining, May 2002
- 720 Gilles Saint-Paul, Some Evolutionary Foundations for Price Level Rigidity, May 2002
- 721 Giorgio Brunello and Daniela Sonedda, Labor Tax Progressivity, Wage Determination, and the Relative Wage Effect, May 2002
- 722 Eric van Damme, The Dutch UMTS-Auction, May 2002
- 723 Paolo M. Panteghini, Endogenous Timing and the Taxation of Discrete Investment Choices, May 2002
- 724 Achim Wambach, Collusion in Beauty Contests, May 2002
- 725 Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet, Preponderance of Evidence, May 2002
- 726 Gilles Saint-Paul, Growth Effects of Non Proprietary Innovation, May 2002
- 727 Subir Bose, Gerhard O. Orosel, and Lise Vesterlund, Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding, May 2002
- 728 Erik Leertouwer and Jakob de Haan, How to Use Indicators for ‘Corporatism’ in Empirical Applications, May 2002
- 729 Matthias Wrede, Small States, Large Unitary States and Federations, May 2002
- 730 Christian Schultz, Transparency and Tacit Collusion in a Differentiated Market, May 2002
- 731 Volker Grossmann, Income Inequality, Voting Over the Size of Public Consumption, and Growth, May 2002
- 732 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Working Time and Employment under Uncertainty, May 2002
- 733 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume, and Lars Sørgaard, Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers, May 2002
- 734 Saku Aura, Does the Balance of Power Within a Family Matter? The Case of the Retirement Equity Act, May 2002
- 735 Sandro Brusco and Fausto Panunzi, Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets, May 2002
- 736 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, Strategic Power Revisited, May 2002

- 737 Martin W. Cripps, Godfrey Keller, and Sven Rady, Strategic Experimentation: The Case of Poisson Bandits, May 2002
- 738 Pierre André Chiappori and Bernard Salanié, Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work, June 2002
- 739 Robert J. Gary-Bobo and Sophie Larribeau, A Structural Econometric Model of Price Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Industry, June 2002
- 740 Laurent Linnemer, When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare, June 2002
- 741 Gebhard Kirchgässner and Friedrich Schneider, On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy, June 2002
- 742 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax, June 2002
- 743 Robert Fenge, Silke Uebelmesser, and Martin Werding, Second-best Properties of Implicit Social Security Taxes: Theory and Evidence, June 2002
- 744 Wendell Fleming and Jerome Stein, Stochastic Optimal Control, International Finance and Debt, June 2002
- 745 Gene M. Grossman, The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade, June 2002
- 746 Oleksiy Ivaschenko, Growth and Inequality: Evidence from Transitional Economies, June 2002
- 747 Burkhard Heer, Should Unemployment Benefits be Related to Previous Earnings?, July 2002
- 748 Bas van Aarle, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Jacob Engwerda, and Joseph Plasmans, Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers' Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union, July 2002
- 749 Hans Gersbach, Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs, July 2002
- 750 Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?, July 2002
- 751 Jonas Agell and Helge Bennmærker, Wage Policy and Endogenous Wage Rigidity: A Representative View From the Inside, July 2002
- 752 Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies, July 2002
- 753 Rebecca M. Blank, U.S. Welfare Reform: What's Relevant for Europe?, July 2002
- 754 Ruslan Lukach and Joseph Plasmans, Measuring Knowledge Spillovers Using Patent Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data, July 2002

- 755 Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Boom-Bust Cycles in Middle Income Countries: Facts and Explanation, July 2002
- 756 Jan K. Brueckner, Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis, July 2002
- 757 Lawrence M. Kahn, The Impact of Wage-Setting Institutions on the Incidence of Public Employment in the OECD: 1960-98, July 2002
- 758 Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Policy in the European Union, August 2002
- 759 Chandima Mendis, External Shocks and Banking Crises in Developing Countries: Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter?, August 2002
- 760 Bruno S. Frey and Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis, August 2002
- 761 Lars Calmfors and Åsa Johansson, Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and Monetary Union, August 2002
- 762 Alexander R. W. Robson and Stergios Skaperdas, Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem, August 2002
- 763 Horst Raff, Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment, August 2002
- 764 Alex Cukierman and V. Anton Muscatelli, Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability? – Theory and Evidence, August 2002
- 765 Giovanni Peri, Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Externalities, August 2002
- 766 Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh, Equilibrium Vengeance, August 2002
- 767 Sam Bucovetsky and Michael Smart, The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions, August 2002
- 768 Tapio Palokangas, International Labour Market Regulation and Economic Growth with Creative Destruction, August 2002
- 769 Rudi Dornbusch, The New International Architecture, September 2002
- 770 Hans-Werner Sinn, Weber's Law and the Biological Evolution of Risk Preferences: The Selective Dominance of the Logarithmic Utility Function, September 2002
- 771 Thomas Mayer, The Macroeconomic Loss Function: A Critical Note, September 2002
- 772 Seppo Honkapohja and Kaushik Mitra, Learning Stability in Economies with Heterogenous Agents, September 2002
- 773 David Laidler, Inflation Targets Versus International Monetary Integration – A Canadian Perspective, September 2002

- 774 Morten I. Lau, Panu Poutvaara, and Andreas Wagener, The Dynamic Cost of the Draft, September 2002
- 775 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Charles van Marrewijk, Locational Competition and Agglomeration: The Role of Government Spending, September 2002
- 776 Anke S. Kessler and Christoph Lülfesmann, The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments, September 2002
- 777 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Lars Sørgard, Unionized Oligopoly, Trade Liberalization and Location Choice, September 2002
- 778 Antonio Merlo and François Ortalo-Magné, Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England, September 2002
- 779 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Labour Market Adjustment under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, September 2002
- 780 Michael S. Michael, International Migration, Income Taxes and Transfers: A Welfare Analysis, September 2002
- 781 Clemens Fuest and Alfons Weichenrieder, Tax Competition and Profit Shifting: On the Relationship between Personal and Corporate Tax Rates, October 2002
- 782 Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse, Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry, October 2002
- 783 Johann K. Brunner and Susanne Pech, Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand, October 2002
- 784 Gregory D. Hess and Eduard Pelz, The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment, October 2002
- 785 Jan Erik Askildsen, Uwe Jirjahn, and Stephen C. Smith, Works Councils and Environmental Investment: Theory and Evidence from German Panel Data, October 2002
- 786 Geir H. Bjønnes, Dagfinn Rime, and Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, Volume and Volatility in the FX-Market: Does it matter who you are?, October 2002